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WHY THE $41 TRILLION
WEALTH TRANSFER ESTIMATE IS STILL VALID:
A REVIEW OF CHALLENGES AND QUESTIONS
Introduction
The release of the report, Millionaires and the Millennium: New
Estimates of the Forthcoming Wealth Transfer and the Prospects
for a Golden Age of Philanthropy by the Social Welfare Research
Institute at Boston College in 1999 regenerated interest in the
intergenerational transfer of wealth.1 Although the report docu-
mented a low-, a medium- and a high-growth scenario, the most
cited figure is the low-growth minimum estimate of $41 trillion
(in 1998 dollars) during the 55-year period from 1998 through
2052.2
During the year following the report’s release, interest
centered on how much greater than $41 trillion the wealth transfer
might actually be. As the recession of 2001 became apparent, the
focus began to shift to whether the $41 trillion figure was, in fact,
too high. The continued downward trend in equity markets in
recent months has renewed concern that the ultimate transfer may
fall short of $41 trillion.
This commentary reviews the validity of the $41 trillion
estimate in light of recent economic conditions, as well as several
other critical challenges that were previously raised regarding the
accuracy of the earlier $10 trillion estimate3 of intergenerational
wealth transfer.4 It does not explicitly deal with the middle- and
upper-growth scenarios; however, the arguments made in support
of the $41 trillion estimate often apply to the higher estimates.
The principal conclusion is that the $41 trillion estimate remains
valid as a 2% low-growth estimate, even in light of recessionary
growth, depressed stock market, and several other criticisms
discussed below. The 2% growth scenario provides a lower-bound
estimate of wealth transfer over the 55-year period, which will be
at least $41 trillion.
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Background
During 1999 we developed a simulation model to
project the transfer of wealth from the 1998 adult
population via their final estates (estates with no
surviving spouse)5 during the 55-year period from
1998 through 2052. Since there was no consensus on
how wealth would grow in the future, we used the
model to simulate three scenarios: 1) a low-growth
scenario that assumed 2% real secular growth and
lower than empirically estimated saving rates; 2) a
middle-growth scenario that assumed 3% real secular
growth and empirically estimated saving rates; and 3)
a high-growth scenario that assumed 4% real secular
growth and higher than empirically estimated savings
rates. In each scenario, the model estimated the total
value of estates and, based on historical data, the
distribution of this total among heirs, government
(taxes), charitable organizations (charitable bequests),
and various estate fees.6
The results of these analyses are summarized in
Exhibit A. The low-growth simulation estimates $41
trillion, the middle-growth simulation estimates $73
trillion, and the high-growth scenario estimates $136
trillion of wealth transfer during the period from 1998
through 2052. It should be noted at the outset that
prior to the release of the wealth transfer projections,
staff economists at the Council of Economic Advisors
reviewed the methods and assumptions used to derive
the estimates. The Council subsequently adopted the
$41 trillion figure as its official estimate of wealth
transfer. After its release, Millionaires and the Millen-
nium was informally assessed by government econo-
mists at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, who
concluded that the $41 trillion projection was a rea-
sonable lower bound. Furthermore, statistics from the
report have been used by staff economists at the
Congressional Budget Office in analysis related to
wealth transfer. While we developed three scenarios,
the most often cited and widely adopted has been the
low-growth estimate.  Since recent queries concern-
ing the estimates suggest that even the low-growth
estimate may be too optimistic, the following will
focus on the continued validity of the $41 trillion
estimate.
Challenges and Comments
The following is a list of various issues surrounding
the wealth transfer estimates that have been raised
over the past three years.
The Recession-Proof Estimate
Challenge One: The wealth transfer estimate is based
on the robust growing economy during the latter half
of the 1990s and fails to account for current and/or
future recessions and downturns in equity, real estate,
or other markets.
Comments: The $41 trillion wealth transfer estimate
assumes only a 2% secular real rate of growth in the
$32 trillion of personally held wealth in 1998 rather
than the high rates of growth in personally held
wealth attained in the late 1990s. The simulation
model is not affected by short-term fluctuations
downward due to recessions and depressed markets,
or short-term fluctuations upward due to expansions
and bull markets, since it relies on long-term trends in
the growth of wealth to derive its estimates.  Even if
recessions are more common than expansions during
the 55 years spanned by the simulation, 2% is still a
low bound for secular growth.
Two points support the conservative nature of
the 2% secular growth assumption and consequently
the conservative nature of the $41 trillion estimate.
First, since 1950 (from 1950 through 2001), a period
that includes both booms and busts, the gross domes-
tic product of the United States grew at an average
rate of 3.39% per year in inflation adjusted real terms;
the value of household wealth grew at an annual real
rate of 3.34%; and the value of all corporate stocks
and mutual funds owned by households grew at a real
rate of 4.47%. Thus, the $41 trillion estimate, which
assumes only a 2% secular trend in the growth of
personally held wealth, is based on growth rates
below historic secular trends.
Second, even if we assume a secular growth
rate of 2%, as we did in the simulation, the $32 tril-
lion owned by Americans in 1998 will grow to $95
trillion (1998 dollars) in 2052, and if we consider that
if personally held wealth were to grow at its historical
secular rate of 3.34%, the $32 trillion of wealth
owned by American households in 1998 would grow
to $196 trillion (1998 dollars). In other words, $41
trillion will be less than half to less than a quarter of
total personally held wealth in 2052. In this light, $41
trillion is both a reasonable and plausible low esti-
mate of the amount of wealth that will be transferred
via estates in the 55-year period as the economy
continues to grow and the population continues to
mature, retire and eventually die.
The $41 trillion estimate of wealth transfer is
not affected by short-term economic fluctuations and
if wealth continues to grow in the next 51 years as it
has in the past 51 years, the transfer amount will be
less than a quarter of the total value of personally held
wealth in 2052.
Past and Present Wealth
Challenge Two: The wealth transfer estimate is based
on an unusually high level of personally owned
wealth when stocks and bonds were near historic
peaks; the estimate would be significantly lower were
it based on the current level of personally owned
wealth.
Comments: Like the secular growth rates, the $32
trillion baseline estimate of personally owned wealth
is a conservative, low estimate and compares with the
estimates released in 2001 by Federal Reserve Flow
of Funds Accounts7 implying that total household
wealth amounted to at least $32 trillion in 1998.8
Our calculation of baseline wealth includes
only the value of marketable assets and excludes such
items as defined-benefit pension plans, present value
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of annuitized income streams, non-luxury personal
possessions (e.g., clothing, toiletries and other con-
sumer non-durables), expected inheritance, and insur-
ance without a cash surrender value, among other
assets with little or no marketable value.
Despite much speculation, the net impact of
financial markets on the aggregate value of personally
owned wealth has been relatively small. Although the
value of personally owned wealth has declined by 7%
from its high in 1999, its value in the second quarter
of 2002 is nearly equal to its value in 1998. The Fed-
eral Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts indicate that,
although the value of personally owned equities fell
35% in real terms from 1998 to the second quarter of
2002, total household wealth declined by less than
1.3% in real terms, in substantial part due to a real
increase of 22% in real estate and other tangible
assets and an 18% real increase in personally owned
municipal, corporate and foreign bonds during this
period. In fact, were it not for an increase of 21% in
household debt, personally owned wealth would have
increased 2% in real terms from its 1998 value.
Although household wealth surpassed $32
trillion after 1998, reaching a peak of approximately
$36 trillion, it has, as of Q2 2002, returned to its 1998
level of $32 trillion (1998 dollars). Therefore, were
the wealth transfer estimates based on the current
level of household wealth instead of the 1998 value,
they would remain unchanged. Specifically, the low-
growth scenario would still produce an estimate of
$41 trillion.
Spending the Kids’ Inherit-
ance?
Challenge Three: The majority of Americans start to
spend down their assets when they reach retirement
and the wealth transfer estimates do not take into
account this expenditure pattern.
Comments: Most American families do begin to
spend down their assets when they reach retirement
and most non-wealthy families continue to spend
down their assets thereafter. However, for most
wealthy families, a brief period of spending down
their assets at retirement age, is followed by a growth
of assets in their later years that exceeds their
dissaving (drawing down of assets). The simulation
takes this life-cycle pattern into account, with sepa-
rate, empirically derived life-cycle savings rates for
families with less than a million dollars in wealth and
for families with at least a million dollars in wealth.
The empirically derived rate of annual savings
for families with less than a million dollars in wealth
(about 95% of families in 1998) is positive until
approximately age 60 (roughly retirement age), after
which it turns negative and becomes increasingly
negative as the family members age, spend more than
they earn, and spend down their assets. Even when
their life-cycle savings rates are combined with 2%
secular growth in their wealth, the assets of families
with less than a million dollars continue to be drawn
down after age 60. The simulation takes this into
account by incorporating a negative savings rate
among families with less than a million dollars in
wealth for all cohorts aged 60 and older.
The empirically derived rate of annual savings
for families with a million dollars or more in wealth
(about 5% of families in 1998) is somewhat different
from their less wealthy counterparts. These families
have a brief period of dissaving starting at approxi-
mately age 60 when they reallocate assets to provide
a stream of income for their retirement years, a legacy
to heirs, and a social capital legacy through taxes or
charitable contributions. But unlike those of their less
wealthy counterparts, the life-cycle savings rates of
wealthy families become less negative as they grow
older, i.e. beyond age 70. In fact, when their life-cycle
savings rates are combined with 2% secular growth in
their wealth, wealthy families see their wealth begin
to grow after age 70.
It should also be noted that as a hedge against a
potential decline in future savings rates, the low-
growth simulation assumes that all life-cycle savings
rates are a substantial 1% lower for all age cohorts
than empirical estimates, based on data from the 1995
and 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances.  Therefore,
the low-growth scenario assumes that both wealthy
and non-wealthy Americans consume their assets
during retirement faster than in reality, thus allowing
for retired American parents to spend an even larger
amount of “their children’s inheritance” without
reducing the $41 trillion estimate.
Live Long and Prosper?
Challenge Four: Americans have been living longer
and are projected to live even longer in the future.
The average American family will be spending their
assets for a longer period of time, leaving smaller
amounts of wealth to be transferred than are esti-
mated by the simulation.
Comments: Americans have been living longer, are
projected to live even longer in the future and are
making financial plans to do so. Trends toward later
retirement, increased part-time employment during
retirement and the continued growth in wealth among
elder wealth holders, mean that despite increased
longevity, aggregate assets will be drawn down more
slowly than would otherwise be the case.
The simulation is based on current rates of mortality
and current rates of dissaving. Although Americans
will live longer than indicated by the 1998 mortality
rates used in the simulation, research shows that
many Americans, at all levels of wealth, are employed
at least part time well past age 60. They are able to
maintain a given level of consumption without draw-
ing down their assets as rapidly as if they were not
employed.
The Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College finds that in order to maintain their standards
of living during their retirement years, older workers
have increased their labor force participation from
59.5% to nearly 62.0% in the period from January
2000 to August 2002. The Center explains this in-
4 SOCIAL WELFARE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
crease as compensating for lower values of private
retirement plans, but the trend toward working during
retirement may more generally be interpreted as an
attempt by retirees to maintain their standard of living
in light of better health and longer life spans relative
to their parents.9
For the average non-wealthy American, longer
life implies less wealth transfer via their final estates,
especially if they do not work during retirement.
Whether they work or not, retired wealth holders
dissave less the longer they live since their wealth
tends to grow faster than it is spent. A decline in
wealth at age 60 turns into accumulation of additional
wealth by the time wealth holders are age 70 and
older, and for those over 70, the longer they live the
more wealth they have, and the larger the value of
their estates. Thus, for wealthy Americans longer life
implies increased wealth transfer via their final es-
tates.
The $41 trillion wealth transfer is split unevenly
between non-wealthy and wealthy estates. About a
third of the wealth transfer comes from estates of
families with less than a million dollars in assets at
time of death (93% of families over the whole 55-
year period); the remaining two-thirds comes from
families with a million dollars or more assets at time
of death (7% of families). Not counting the effect of
greater labor force participation among older workers,
the net effect of an additional year of life for all
Americans would be to decrease the $41 trillion
estimate by less than $0.3 trillion. For all retirees
regardless of wealth, the final estates of those that
remain in the labor force will have a larger value than
the estates of those who do not work during retire-
ment years. When coupled with increased labor force
participation among older workers, an additional year
of life for all Americans could actually increase the
$41 trillion estimate by a small amount.
Annuitized Income and The
Wealth Transfer Estimate
Challenge Five: Annuitized income has been grow-
ing rapidly in recent years, in large part due to the
growing number of retirees with annuitized retirement
income. If the trend toward increased annuitization
continues, the amount of wealth to be transferred will
decline for two reasons. First, in order to purchase an
annuity, individuals need to draw down their assets.
Second, an annuity ceases to exist when the recipient
dies, and so contributes no value to the estate of the
recipient/decedent. If the $41 trillion estimate does
not take into account the reduction in wealth due to
increased amounts of annuities, it will over estimate
the coming wealth transfer.
Comments: Annuitized income has been growing
rapidly in recent years, due in large part to the grow-
ing number of retirees with annuitized retirement
income, much of it in the form of Social Security and
other defined-benefit retirement plans, but also due to
the whole or partial annuitization of defined-contribu-
tion plans. The effect of the growth in annuitized
income on the $41 trillion wealth transfer estimate is a
complicated issue and could potentially affect it in
three ways: 1) if the present value of annuitized in-
come in the calculation of wealth was included; 2) if
the value of defined-benefit retirement plans in the
calculation of wealth was included; and 3) if the
annuitization of defined-contribution retirement assets
in the simulation’s dissaving rates were not included.
However, none of the three were done in determining
the wealth transfer estimate.
The simulation does not include the present value of
annuitized income or any defined-benefit retirement
plan income (e.g., Social Security, government pen-
sion plans and private sector defined-benefit plans) in
the calculation of wealth since neither is transferable
at death. Only the market value of defined-contribu-
tion retirement plans (e.g., 401k and 403b plans) and
individual retirement accounts was included in the
calculation of wealth. Furthermore, since current rates
of annuitization of defined-contribution retirement
assets are already included in the simulation’s
lifecycle savings rates, the $41 trillion estimate is not
affected.
Commentators have proposed two scenarios that
might affect the estimate: 1) what if there were more
participation in defined-contribution plans; and 2)
what if more and more people choose to annuitize a
larger proportion of their assets? First, since increased
participation in defined-contribution plans would
increase the pre-retirement estimate of wealth, the $41
trillion estimate would be rendered too low. There is
evidence that retirees are choosing to receive a larger
proportion of retirement assets as lump-sum distribu-
tions rather than annuities, which they are more in-
clined to save than spend. Second, annuitization
involves drawing down assets to purchase a future
stream of income for life. Even if there were a sub-
stantial increase in the rate at which retirees annuitize
their assets, there would be little net effect on their
wealth at time of death because of the actuarial nature
of annuities. When retirees choose to annuitize assets,
they receive a guaranteed income for life and can
support their standards of living in part from this
income, therefore, they draw down their remaining
assets less rapidly than if they had not annuitized a
portion of their assets. Since annuities are calculated
on an actuarial basis, the initial draw down of assets is
closely balanced by reduced draw down of assets in
later years for the population as a whole.
The $41 trillion estimate is not compromised by
the current level and trends in annuitization, or by the
way the current simulation model takes them into
account.  If anything, the growth in defined-
contribution pensions, the tendency to receive
distributions from defined-contribution plans as
assets, and the tendency to spend from such assets at a
lower rate than had the pension been received as
annuity income,10 combine to make it likely that more
than $41 trillion will be transferred.
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Baby Boomers and the Wealth
Transfer Estimate
Challenge Six: The projected estimate is unrealistic
since the baby-boom generation, the largest
generation ever, will not inherit anything close to $41
trillion.
Comments: Many queries about the $41 trillion
wealth transfer estimate, often from boomers them-
selves, wrongly assume two things about the report.
First, that the entire transfer of wealth is going to
heirs; and second, that it is going only to boomers.
“Wealth transfer” is not synonymous with “inherit-
ance.” The original report carefully points out that
only $25 trillion of the $41 trillion transfer will pass
from decedents’ estates to heirs. The remaining $17
trillion will go to estate taxes, charitable bequests and
estate settlement expenses. It is important to under-
stand that while $25 trillion is going to heirs, that
figure is the amount of wealth that will be inherited
from 1998 through 2052 by all generations, not just
the boomers. Boomers may well inherit $7.2 trillion,
but the majority of the inheritances will be transferred
to subsequent generations, including the children and
grandchildren of the boomers. As the boomer genera-
tion ages and dies during the 55-year period, their role
in the wealth transfer process will be far greater as
benefactors than as beneficiaries.
Wealthy and Non-Wealthy
Estates
Challenge Seven: Only approximately 2% of estates,
those of the wealthiest citizens who die each year, are
required to file federal estate tax forms. Since wealth
transfer is concentrated among this very small frac-
tion of estates, the vast majority of estates will not
participate significantly in the $41 trillion wealth
transfer.
Comments: The $41 trillion is an estimate of total
wealth transfer via final estates of the entire 1998
adult population, regardless of the size of the estate.
Due to growth in personal wealth and an increased
number of estates from the baby-boomer generation,
the number of estates valued at $1 million or more
will grow from somewhat less than 2% in 1998 to
approximately 7%, on average, over the entire period
from 1998 through 2052. Although two thirds ($27
trillion) of the transfer will be concentrated among
this wealthiest 7% of estates, a still substantial
amount ($14 trillion) will be dispersed over a broad
range of less wealthy estates. The inequality of the
size of estates does not affect the $41 trillion estimate
and how it is divided: $6.0 trillion in total charitable
bequests, $24.6 trillion in total bequests to heirs, $8.5
trillion in total estate taxes and $1.6 trillion in total
estate fees.
How much will Heirs Receive?
Challenge Eight: The $41 trillion transfer is not a
realistic estimate of wealth transfer since the vast
majority of heirs will receive small inheritances, if
any.
Comments: All of the $41 trillion transfer is not
going to heirs. Substantial amounts will go to charity,
taxes and fees. The share of the low-growth estimate
of wealth transfer going to heirs is $25 trillion. Be-
cause most estates have more than one heir, the size
of inheritance will be relatively small per heir and the
effect will be diffused throughout the population.
While the simulation does not identify individual
heirs and does not separately estimate the size of each
inheritance, the initial report documents that about
half of the aggregate bequests to heirs will be concen-
trated among heirs of the wealthiest 7% of estates
with the remaining half disbursed among heirs of the
remaining 93% of estates. The average total transfer
to heirs from estates valued at $1 million or more will
be approximately $1.9 million, 13 times larger than
the average amount (approximately $150,000) that
will be shared among the heirs of estates valued at
less than $1 million. In each case, the total bequest
amount will be divided among the total number of
heirs of a given estate. As estates get smaller, the
proportion going to heirs approaches 100%, with little
or nothing going to charity or taxes. The larger the
estate, the greater the proportion bequeathed to char-
ity and taxes, and the lower the proportion be-
queathed to heirs. Nonetheless, heirs of wealthy
estates will likely receive hundreds of thousands, if
not millions of dollars, while heirs of less affluent
estates will receive at most thousands of dollars,
while tens of millions of potential heirs will receive
little or nothing at all.
The fundamental point in regard to the relative shares
of estates going to heirs, taxes, charity or to estate
fees is that they do not affect the validity of the $41
trillion wealth transfer estimate.
Avery and Rendall’s
$10.4 Trillion Estimate
Challenge Nine: Robert B. Avery and Michael S.
Rendall estimated an intergenerational wealth trans-
fer of $10.4 trillion for the 55-year period from 1990
through 2044. Why is the Social Welfare Research
Institute’s (SWRI) simulation figure four times
higher?
Comments: Avery and Rendall’s $10.4 trillion esti-
mate is not an estimate of the transfer of wealth from
the entire 1989 adult population over the subsequent
55 years, but an estimate only of wealth to be trans-
ferred from the World War II generation to their baby-
boom children, estate taxes, charitable bequests and
estate fees. In contrast, SWRI’s $41 trillion estimate
is a low estimate of wealth to be transferred over the
55-year period from 1998 through 2052 from the
estates of the entire 1998 adult population (age 18 and
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over) to heirs, taxes, charity and fees.
The goal of Avery and Rendall’s analysis was
to estimate the prospective inheritances of the baby-
boom generation from 1990 to 2044. In order to do
so, they ensured that that all adults in the analysis
would die within 55 years. They restricted their
analysis to families with children headed by a person
age 50 or older in 1989, who was a generation older
than the baby boomer generation and whose heirs
were baby boomers. Their analysis predicted that this
segment of the World War II generation would trans-
fer a total of $10.4 trillion in 1989 dollars, or $13.7
trillion in 1998 dollars, via their estates during the 55-
year period from 1990 through 2044. This estimate is
often mistakenly thought to be an estimate of total
intergenerational wealth transfer during the period.
SWRI’s analysis differs from the prior analysis of
Avery and Rendall in three important ways.
1) SWRI’s goal was to estimate the total wealth trans-
fer from the entire 1998 adult population during the
55 years from 1998 through 2052, rather than from
the segment age 50 and older with children.
2) SWRI’s simulation starts with a larger pool of
wealth. The wealth of the 1998 population was 5.27%
larger in real terms compared to the wealth of the
1989 population.
3) SWRI’s simulation includes wealth transferred
from aging baby boomers as well as wealth trans-
ferred to them. The bulge in the size of the boomer
generation produces a similar bulge in the number of
estates and the aggregate amount to be transferred
when the boomers die.
In light of these differences, SWRI’s $41 trillion
estimate appears less discordant with Avery and
Rendall’s $10.4 trillion estimate than it might at first
glance.
General Comments
In addition to the issues raised above, the $41 trillion
estimate is a conservative estimate of total wealth
transfer from 1998 through 2052 for two further
reasons.  First, SWRI’s estimate neglects wealth
transfer from the estates of persons who have not
reached adulthood in 1998, the estates of anyone born
between 1998 and 2052, and the estates of immi-
grants who enter the country and die during the 55-
year period. Second, SWRI’s projection
underestimates the value of estates of people who are
less than 30-years old in 1998, because it does not
simulate marriage and business formation for these
age cohorts.
The simulation estimate is based solely on
wealth transferred from the population aged 18 or
older in 1998. For those in the sample who age and
die over the 55-year period, the simulation estimates
the value of their estates at time of death to be $41
trillion. However, there is a continuous stream of
people being added to the population through birth
and net immigration, who will also engage in eco-
nomic activity, acquire some degree of wealth, and
some of whom will die during the 55-year period,
adding their wealth to the total wealth transfer. The
$41 trillion estimate is a low estimate in part because
it ignores these groups and their contribution to
wealth transfer.
The wealth transfer model neglects family
formation and new business formation, which are the
cornerstones of wealth accumulation, especially
among younger age cohorts.  Among middle and
older age cohorts there is little net effect of the exclu-
sion of these trends, because the simulation also
neglects the offsetting factors of divorce and business
bankruptcy among these cohorts.  However, the ex-
clusion of the effects of family and new business
formation among the youngest age cohorts, those
under age 30, means that for these younger people the
path to increased wealth in the simulation is confined
to their incomes, received inheritance, and growth in
their relatively modest individual portfolios. The
simulation is thereby biased against young people
increasing their wealth and produces a smaller num-
ber of millionaires in the later years of the simulation
than would be the case had family formation and new
business creation been taken into account. At the end
of the simulation, persons who were aged 20 to 29 in
1998 are aged 75 to 84. Fewer simulated millionaires
in this age cohort means smaller value of estates and
less wealth transfer than there should be in these latter
years. The $41 trillion estimate thus underestimates
wealth transferred near the end of the 55-year period.
Inter-Vivos Gifts
and Wealth Transfer
In recent years, there has been evidence, especially
among the wealthy, of a growth in the systematization
of charitable giving during the donor’s lifetime and of
increased utilization of planned-giving vehicles that
allow donors to make substantial charitable
contributions while they are alive.  These trends, in
combination with what appears initially to be a
decline in charitable bequests, may presage a shift
among many wealth holders from making charitable
bequests to making inter-vivos charitable gifts. Both
empirical and anecdotal evidence points to donors
wishing to make their charitable contributions in life
rather than at death, in part, to increase the
effectiveness and significance of their giving.
Furthermore, this desire by donors is being
complemented and encouraged by new approaches to
financial planning, where tax considerations take a
subordinate role to the exploration of clients’ values in
shaping their financial biography.11 If there is a shift
from charitable bequests to increased inter-vivos
giving, it will reduce the wealth of donors (unless they
reduce their consumption) and will subsequently
reduce the size of their estates and the amount of
wealth transferred via their estates.
As more substantial charitable gifts are made
during the donor’s lifetime and as more transfers to
heirs are made as gifts during the donor’s lifetime, the
size of estates may well decline.  However, if we
combine the additional inter-vivos and bequest dona-
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tions, there will be no overall decrease in charitable
giving, and indeed, there could be an increase in the
amount donated to charity, as more donors experience
the satisfaction of a more engaged philanthropy.
A major shift from charitable bequests to inter-
vivos giving could well reduce the $41 trillion esti-
mate of wealth transfer, but only if we continue to
define wealth transfer in terms of the value of final
estates. If the definition of wealth transfer is broad-
ened to embrace both inter-vivos transfers (to heirs,
charity, and wealth taxes) as well as transfers via
estates, then the $41 trillion transfer estimate is too
small, even as a low-end estimate.
Conclusion
Several issues that may affect the value of personally
held wealth in either the short or long term have been
discussed, including recessions and booms, the initial
amount of personally owned wealth in the first year
of the simulation, dissaving during retirement, in-
creased longevity and increases in annuitized in-
comes. None of these factors warrants a reduction in
the $41 trillion low-growth estimate. Based on the
average real growth rate during the previous 51 years,
wealth owned by the entire population alive in 2052
will reach $196 trillion (1998 dollars). In that year,
the validity of the $41 trillion estimate will be known.
Even in view of all the issues we have discussed, we
still believe that the $41 trillion estimate will be low.
The relevant question is not whether $41 trillion will
be transferred, but how much more than $41 trillion
will be transferred?
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 Projections for Intergenerational
Wealth Transfer
1998-2052*
Low Estimate Middle Estimate High Estimate
Total (2% secular real
growth in wealth)
(3% secular real
growth in wealth)
(4% secular real
growth in wealth)
Number of Estates 87,839,311 87,839,311 87,839,311
Value of Estates** $40.6 $72.9 $136.2
Estate Fees $1.6 $2.9 $5.5
Estate Taxes $8.5 $18.0 $40.6
Bequest to Charity $6.0 $11.6 $24.8
Bequest to Heirs $24.6 $40.4 $65.3
*Derived from tables in Millionaires and the Millennium: New Estimates of
the Forthcoming Wealth Transfer and the Prospects for a Golden Age of
Philanthropy, Schervish, Paul G. and Havens, John J., Social Welfare
Research Institute, Boston College, Boston, MA, October 1999,
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**All dollar values are in trillions of 1998 dollars.
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